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LIBERTY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: 1943-44

John Raeburn Green*

E

LSEWHERE efforts have been made to survey the stattJ.s of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights with respect
to their protection against state abridgment. 1 The decisions of the Supreme Court were examined, from the February term, 1790, through
the 1942 term. It was observed that the struggle to obtain for these
rights and liberties federal constitutional protection against state abridgment, as well as against federal abridgment, had been almost continuous
since the adoption of the Constitution; that Madison had sought, unsuccessfully, to include in the Bill of Rights guaranties against state
abridgment for freedom of speech and of the press, for religious freedom, and for the right of trial by jury in criminal cases; 2 that not7
withstanding this failure the force and vit~lity of the view that these
rights and liberties must somehow be safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights ( without anything more) against state denial were so great and
so irrepressible as to keep the question almost constantly before the
Court from 1833 to 1913; that with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, stronger bases on which to build the claim to
constitutional protection became availabl~, the contendon being made-'unsuccessfully, on the whole, but always with the support of a vigorous
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1
Green, "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment,"· 27 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. ·
497 (1942); Green, "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment: 1942-43," 28
WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 251 (1943).
2
As passed by the House of Representatives, this Amendment read: "The equal
rights of conscience, the freedom of speech or of the press, and the right of trial by jury
in criminal cases, shall not be infringed by any State." I Ann. Cong., 1st Cong., 1st
sess., H.R., August 17, 1789, at p. 755. It failed of passage in the Senate. For an
admirable discussic;m of this, see Warren, "The New 'Liberty' Under the Fourteenth
Amendment," 39 HARv. L. REv. 431 at 433-435 (1926).
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minority of the Court-for some fifty years that these liberties were
privileges or immunities, protected by that clause of the amendment;
and that eventually, in 192 5, Gitlow v. New York 11 established the protection for freedom of speech and of the press (guaranteed by the First
Amendment), as integral elements of the "liberty" which the due
process clause safeguards against state deprivation.4
The inclusion in liberty, in 1937, of the right to peaceable assembly/ also guaranteed by the First Amendment, and the Court's
remarkably cautious progress toward the same result with respect to the
free exercise of religion, which ultimately obtained protection in 1940,6
were discussed. So also was the partial development of protection of •
the rights which the Bill of Rights guarantees to the accused in a
criminal prosecution, including the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right against double jeopardy, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment; the right of confrontation of witnesses and the right to the assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth; and the effect upon this
development of the "Fair Trial Rule" as quite recently elaborated and
applied by the Court. 7
While the Atlantic Charter, now more than three years old, made
no mention either of freedom of expression or of religious freedom, in
transmitting it to the Congress President Roosevelt wrote:
"It is also unnecessary for me to point out that the declaration
of-principles includes of necessity the world need for freedom of
religion and freedom of information. No society of the world
organized under the announced principles could survive without
3

268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925).
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S. Ct. 655 (1927), was the first decision
actually extending the protection, but this and succeeding cases have been rested upon
the authority of the ambiguous dictum in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 at 666
(1925).
As is well known, originally "liberty'' had meant simply freedom from physical
restraint. The expansion to include these freedoms resulted from an earlier expansion to
include liberty of contract. See Green, "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment,"
27 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 497 at 505-514 (1942).
5
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937). See also Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732 (1937); and Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496,
59 S. Ct. 954 (1939). With respect to protection of the right to petition for a redress
of grievances, exercised independently of any assembly, see Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 at 277, 62 S. Ct. 190 (1941).
6
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940).
7
See Green, "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 27 WASH. 'UNIV.
L. Q. 497 at 529-535 (1942); Green, "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment:
1942-43," 28 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 251 at 270-271 (1943).
4
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these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which
we strive." 8
This program has been well received; 0 and whatever dpubt may be
entertained regarding its immediate result, it cannot be doubted that it
represents, for the moment at least, our national policy. But it is noteworthy that little attention has been given to the great difficulties inherent in an effort to formulate an international guaranty of the freedoms which the First Amendment guarantees against impairment by
the United States, nor to the even greater difficulties inherent in the
enforcement of such an international guaranty. While it cannot be said
that these freedoms are Anglo-Saxon inventions, and while the United
States is perhaps not the country in which they have attained their
highest development,10 it may be assumed that if any international
8
For the texts of the Charter and of the President's message of August 2, 1941, to
the Congress, see 5 U.S. Department of State Bulletin, No. 112, p. 125 (Aug. 16,
1941); id. at 147. The texts may also be found in 35 AM. J. INT. L., Official Documents Section, 191 at 193 (1941). Comment may be found in Crowther, "AngloAmerican Pitfalls," 20 FoREIGN AFFAIRS I (1941).
9
Governor Thomas E. Dewey has written that we must insist "that any organization for peace shall fully, frankly and boldly require of all participants a declaration
establishing 'in principle the right of individuals everywhere to religious and intellectual
liberty'." Dewey, "The Sixth Pillar," CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS 6 (July 12, 1943).
See THE NEW YoRK TIMES, Nov. 15, 1943, 19; 1, for the suggestions of Messrs. Kent
Cooper and Gardner Cowles, Jr., with regard to guaranteeing world-wide freedom
of the press, in future peace treaties; but note that they appear to have had in mind
primarily, if not only, the press' freedom of access to information. The only proposal
at all specific has been made by Mr. Sumner Welles: "Every nation which becomes a
member of the [post-war] international organization to be set up should be obligated,
as a condition of its adherence, to show that its citizens are guaranteed ..• freedom of
religion, of -speech and of information." 43 TIME, Jan. 3, 1944, p. 82. He later
proposed that "freedom of worship; freedom to know the truth through a free press
and a free radio; and freedom of speech" be "securely guaranteed to peoples everywhere," by "a new international bill of rights," through "the inclusion of a provision
in the charter of the futqre international organization that every state must be able to
show, as a requisite to membership in that body, that its nationals are assured of the
enjoyment of these fundamental liberties." He added: "Should any government withhold from its people the freedom of religion, speech and information, it should then be
expelled from the international organization, and proper penalties be adopted." NEw
YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE, Sept. 13, 1944, 21 :1,2. The limitation to "citizens" or
"nationals" seems to be deliberate.
1
Cf. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 at 176,
64 S. Ct. 438 ( 1944): "And the Jehovah's Witnesses are living proof of the fact that
even in this nation, conceived as it was in the ideals of freedom, the "right to practice
religion in unconventional ways is still far from secure. Theirs is a militant and
unpopular faith, pursued with a fanatical zeal. They have suffered brutal beatings; their
property has been destroyed; they have been harassed at every turn by the resurrection
and ~nforcement of little used ordinances and statutes."
Cf. also Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in West Virginia State Board of Education

°
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guaranty of them is attempted, the United States will have a profound
influence in determining the form and extent of the guaranty and
the method of its enforcement. For this reason examination of the
results of the .actual enforcement of the First Amendment guaranties
. may be of particular importanc~ at this time, even though the experience of the Court in such enforcement dates, unfortunately, only from
I 92 7 in the case of freedom of speech and of the press, and from I 940
in the case of the free exercise of religion.11 American principles, even if
they had been arrived at as the result of long experience, would scarcely
be capable of comprehensive international application in detail; but
nevertheless there are perhaps more problems in common with other
nations than would at first be supposed.12 -The American experience,
such as it is, may at least serve as a point of departure for an interna- tional court or commission. The Court's decisions in this field, at its
1943 term, just closed, although fewer in number than in previous
years, are not with.out interest from this point of view.
With regard to the effects of the new liberty, it was observed in
the earlier studies that, since abridgment of freedom of expression and
of the free exercise of religion was attempted much more often by the
states (including their municipalities, counties, school boards and
courts) than by the Federal Government ( which seldom invaded these
freedoms except in time of war), protection of these freedoms against
state denial had immediately vitalized the First Amendment into a safev. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 670-671, 63 S. Ct. u78 (1943): "Particularly in
legislation affecting freedom of thought and freedom of speech much which should
offend a free-spirited society is constitutional."
See Mr. Walter Lippman's comment on the proposal to require international
guarantees of these freedoms: "Our own best contribution to the great cause of freedom
of the press will be to avoid any self-righteous assumption that we here have achieved
freedom of the press in its perfected and final form. We have not." 43 TIME, Jan. 3,

1944, p. 82.

'.

It is hardly necessary to .mention that the development of these freedoms in the
the United States is much in advance of that in certain other countries, allied, enemy
and neutral.
•
·
11
Of course, state courts had earlier enforced the free speech and free press
provisions of state constitutions, but these decisions do not seem either numerous or, as
a rule, important. For one of the few outstanding examples, see State ex rel. AttorneyGeneral v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. lat 12-13, 72 N.W. 193 (1897), which held that
to punish, for contempt of court, a publication which had scandalized the court, would
impair the rights of free speech and free press guaral!,teed by the Wisconsin Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court did not arrive at a similar conclusion, under the First
Amendment, until Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), and then only by a
five-to-four decision.
·
12
See McCown, "Conscience v. The State," 32 CAL. L. REV. l (1944), for an
account of the treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany during the present war.

•
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guard of great practical importance, giving it effect where it was needed
rather than where it was seldom required. The decisions of the 1943-44
term, on the whole, confirm this conclusion. In the eighteen years between 1925 and 1943 the Court had had presented to it no less than
forty-one times the claim that state action had denied a right guaranteed
by the First Amendment, whereas in the same period a similar claim
appeared to have been made only five times with 'respect to federal
action. 18 The Court's opinions at the term just closed deal with three
claims of state denial of these liberties, and with two claims of federal
denial, one of which was a prosecution under the Espionage Act.14 The
1925-44 totals are therefore forty-four claims of state abridgment ahd
seven of federal. 15
THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

The situation as to the free exercise of religion, at the commencement of the 1943 term, was this: Until 1940 the Court had never
protected this freedom against abridgment, either federal or state.
In that year Cantwell v. Connecticut 16 held invalid, as depriving
Jehovah's Witnesses of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, a Connecticut statute which required discretionary licensing for the solicitation of funds for religious causes. At the 1942 term
the Court had followed this with two decisions, Largent v. Texas 17 and
Jam,ison v. Texas, 18 in which it held that two municipal ordinances, one
18

For a listing and tabulation of the decisions, see Green, "Liberty Under the
Fourteenth Amendment," 27 WASH. UNiv. L. _Q_ 497 at 536, n. 194 (1942); Green,
"Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment: 1942-43," 28 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 251 at
252-253, ns. 9, IO (1943).
14
The cases of state abridgment are the following: Cafeteria Employees' Union v.
Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126 (1943); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); and Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 64 S. Ct. 717 (1944). The two
cases in which the claim of federal abridgment was made were United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 64 S. Ct. 882 (1944); and Hartzel v. United States, (U.S. 1944) 64
S. Ct. 1233. All five decisions are discussed in the text.
·
In all computations, memoranda cases have been excluded.
Two of the three cases of state abridgment during the term were the result of
challenges of statutes or ordinances by Jehovah's Witnesses.
15
In thirty-three of the forty-four state cases, which commenced with Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Court sustained the claim, and one of the remaining eleven has since been overruled. In two of the five federal cases a possible
federal abridgment was found.
16
310 U.S. 296 (1940). For comment on this see CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 404 (1941). For a contemporaneous state court decision to the
contrary effect, see Ex parte Williams, 345 Mo. u21, 139 S.W. (2d) 485 (1940).
17
318 U.S. 418, 63 S. Ct. 667 (1943).
18
318 U.S. 413, 63 S. Ct. 669 (1943).
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requiring a discretionary permit for the sale of books and the other
prohibiting the distribution of handbills on the streets, were, when applied to Jehovah's Witnesses, denials both of freedom of religion and
of freedom of the press. The Court then, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,19 held that an ordinance imposing a fl.at license tax on canvassers
was, when applied to the distribution of religious literature by Jehovah's
Witnesses, invalid, as a restraint on the free exercise of religion, and
also as an abridgment of freedom of the press. This five-to-four decision in effect reversed Jones v. Opelika,2° which-by five-to-four alsohad held the contrary; and the judgment in that case was now vacated
and formally reversed. 21 At the same time a divided Court, in Martin
v. Struthers,22 held that an ordinance which prohibited knocking on
doors and doorbell ringing in the distribution of "handbills, circulars
or other advertisements," was, when used to prohibit the activities of
Jehovah's Witnesses, an invasion of freedom of speech and the press,
but three justices regarded it also as an abridgment of the free exercise
of religion. In the second flag salute case, West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,28 a six-to-three majority held that the flag salute
requirement, attacked by Jehovah's Witnesses, was invalid, the opinion
of the Court proceeding upon the ground that this invaded the "liberty
of silence"; but three members of the majority then appeared to regard
it as an invasion of religious freedom.24 Excluding the last two, there
were, then, five decisions in which the Court had protected the free
exercise of religion.
·
Prince v. Massachusetts
Early in the 1943 term the new majority of the Murdock case
demonstrated that it desired at least to pause before going further. Prince
v. Massachusetts 25 dealt with the hand distribution of religious tracts by
Jehovah's Witnesses, as had the Murdock and Opelika cases. But here
19

319 U.S. 105, 63 S. Ct. 870 (1943). For comment, see 42 MICHL. REv. 162
(1943).
.
20
316 U.S. 584, 62 S. Ct. 1231 (1942).
21
Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, 63 S. Ct. 890 (1943).
22
319 U.S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862 (1943).
23
319 U.S. 624 (1943). For comment, see 42 MICH. L. REv. 319 (1943).
24
The three were Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy. However, apparently a
fourth should now be added. Justice Rutledge has since said, in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 at 165 (1944): "The rights of children to exercise their religion, and of
parents to give them religious training and encourage them in the practice of religious
belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have
had recognition .•. in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette."
25
321 U.S. 158 (1944). For comment see 32 GEORGETOWN L. J. 309 (1944).
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the distributor was a girl of nine, Betty Simmon~, who, with her aunt,
stood on a downtown street, holding up copies of the tracts and carrying the usual magazine bag on whi~h was printed "5c per copy," though
copies were given free if the recipient did not desire to make a contribution.26 On the evening in question no one had accepted a tract
from either Betty or her aunt (both of whom were ordained ministers
. of the sect), and neither had received any money. The aunt, who was
also Betty's guardian, was convicted of permitting her to work in violation of the Massachusetts child labor law, which provides that no boy
under twelve and no girl under eighteen shall sell or offer for sale
newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or any other articles in any street
or public place. The guardian made no claim that freedom of the press
had been infringed, but contended that both her own freedom of religion (to teach the child the tenets and practices of her faith), and
Betty's freedom to observe these tenets ( among them "to preach the
Gospel . . . by public distribution" of Watch Tower and Consolation in conformity with the scripture, "A little child shall lead them")
had been violated.
Justice Rutledge, for the majority, pointed out that the Massachusetts court's determination that what the child did was a "sale," or
"offer to sell," and was "work," within the meaning of the statute, had
foreclosed these questions, as· a matter of state law. 27 Referring to appellant's concession that freedom of the press was not abridged, he
suggested that it might be doubted that any of the liberties insured by
the First Amendment could be given higher place than the others.
Here there was a clash between "the obviously earnest claim for freedom of conscience and religious practice," allied to which was "the
parent's claim to authority in her own household and in the_ rearing of
her children," and the state's assertion of authority to protect the welfare of children. "Between contrary pulls of such weight," Justice Rut-.
ledge said,28 "the safest and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no
man's land where this battle has gone on." Posing but not quite answering the clear and present danger question, and the contention that
the statute could not be sustained by any presumption of validity,29
26 As the Court remarked, the story told by the evidence had become familiar and
there were no variations, except for the age of the distributor.
27 He mildly observed: "In this respect the Massachusetts decision is contrary to
the trend in other states." Id., 321 U.S. at 163, n. 5.
28 Id. at 165.
29 See Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 at 161, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939).
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Justice Rutledge referred to the "crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places .•• the diverse influences of the
street," 80 and the emotional, psychological and physical risks attached
t.o propagandizing. The case, he considered, reduced itself to whether
the presence of the child's guardian put a limit to the state's power.
That might lessen the likelihood of some of the evils which the legislation sought to avert, but it could not forestall all of them; and Massachusetts had determined upon an absolute prohibtion; without exception for cases of parental supervision. Observing that, while parents
:might be free to become martyrs themselves, it did not follow that they
were free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
"before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when
they can make that choice for themselves," the Court held that the
power of the state to control the conduct of children in "the public
proclaiming of religion, upon the streets and .in other similar public
places," reached beyond the scope of Jts authority over adults, "as is
true in the case of other freedoms"; 81 and that Massachusetts had not
crossed the boundary of its power. It was careful to limit the ruling to
the facts of the case, saying that all other methods of training and indoctrinating children in religion remained unaffected.
Justice Murphy, whose opinion is the real dissent, conceded that the
power of the state "to control the religious and other activities of children" is greater than its power over similar activities of adults. But,
he said, statutes infringing religious freedom are not aided by any
strong presumption of constitutionality; 82 on the contrary, the First
' Amendment freedoms "are presumed to be invulnerable" and any
attempt to sweep them away "is prima facie invalid." The burden of
justifying_any restriction or prohibition must lie on "those who deny
that the freedoms have been unlawfully invaded." 88 Applying the
30

Id., 321 U.S. at 168.
Id. at 170.
32 He cited Chief Justice Stone's well-known suggestion in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, n. 4, 58 S. Ct. 778 (1938).
33 Id., 321 U.S. at 173. '_To this observer this has seemed implicit in the clear
and present danger rule, as now developed in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941). See 27 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 497 at 560-561 (1942). But Justice Murphy's
language here is noteworthy as being the first forthright and explicit expression of this
concept to be made by any member of the Court. It had been stated three months
earlier by a lower court, in Busey v. District of Columbia, (U.S. Ct. App., D.C. 1943)
138 F. (2d) 592 at 595-596.
.
The antithetic philosophy has been best stated by Justice Frankfurter in the flag
salute cases: his opinion for the Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 60 S. Ct. IOIO (1940) and his dissenting opinion in West Virginia State
81
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clear and present danger test squarely, Justice Murphy observed that
"vague references to the reasonableness" underlying child labor legislation in general did not meet this burden here; that there was no convincing proof of "any grave or immediate danger to the state or to the
health, morals or welfare" of Betty Simmons; that the "crippling effects of child employment" (referred to in the majority opinion) were,
so far as they :flowed from "participation in ordinary commercial activities," irrelevant here; that the "diverse influences of the street" were
bare possibilities, not "grave, immediate, substantial" evils, as the clear
and present danger rule tequired.u These dangers were all exceedingly
remote. The fact that "the zealous exercise of the right to propagandize the community" might result in "violent or disorderly situations
difficult for children to face" was, he protested, "no excuse for prohibiting the exercise of that right."
Justice Jackson (in whose opinion Justices Roberts and Frankfur85
ter concurred) remarked that the novel feature of the decis~on was that
the Court now held that a state might apply child labor laws to restrict
or prohibit an activity, which at the previous term (in the Murdock
case) it had held to occupy "the same high estate under the First
Amendment as do worship in churches and preaching from the pulpits,"
and to have "the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and
conventional exercises of religion." Without accepting that view, Justice Jackson observed that it would appear to follow from it that child
labor laws might be applied both to worship in the cliurches and to the
activity of Jehovah's Witnesses on the streets, if to either. "If the Murdock doctrine stands along with today's decision," he said, "a foundation
is laid for any state intervention in the indoctrination and participation
of children in religion, provided it is done in the name of their health or
welfare." The case brought to the surface "the real basis of disagreement" in the Court in the cases of the previous term. This seemed to be'
"as to the method of establishing limitations which of necessity bound
religious freedom." Justice Jackson's own view, he said was that "the
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 646 (1943)". For thoughtful support
of Justice Frankfurter's position, see Curtis, "Due, and Democratic, Process of Law,"
1944 Wxs. L. REV. 39 at 46 et seq.
'
84
He added: "Indeed; if probabilities are to be indulged in, the likelihood is
that children engaged in serious religious endeavor are immune to such influences.
Gambling, truancy, irregular eating and sleeping habits, and the more serious vices are
not consistent with the high moral character ordinarily displayed by children fulfilling
religious obligations. Moreover, Jehovah's Witness children invariably make their distributions in groups subject at all times to adult or parental control, as was done in this
case.'' Id., 321 U.S. at 175.
85
These three, with Justice Reed, had dissented in the Murdock case.
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limits begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide
with the liberties of others or of the public." He considers that
"money-raising activities" of religious sects, "on a public scale," were
subject to regulation which was not discriminatory and not arbitrary.
In the Murdock case the Court rejected "this principle of separating
immune religious activities from secular ones"; instead, it now "draws
a line based on age that cuts across both true exercise of religion and
auxiliary secular activities." He dissented _"from the grounds of affirmance of a judgment which I think was rightly decided, and upon
right grounds" 36 by the Massachusetts court.
With deforence, it must be said that the question presented by the
majority opinion is not whether it is right, but rather what was
responsible for so serious a misjudgment. For the judicial debate
seems to leave no doubt that here are errors of some magnitude. Murdock v. Pennsylvania and the other decisions of the previous term had
established that the precise activity here involved was an exercise of
religion, immune equally from license tax and from suppression. The
majority:s 7 now, without in the least modifying that view, permits a
complete suppression of this exercise of religion, because the exerciser
is a nine-year old girl. The limitation of the ruling to the facts of the
case may indicate that the Court did not do this without misgivings,
· which were perhaps in the case of some members acute; bu~ it did it.
It did it in the face of an obvious inability to meet the clear and present
danger test, as Justice Murphy shows; and in the face of Justice Jackson's warning that if child labor laws might be applied here, they might
equally be applied to worship in the churches. It did it in spite of the
fact that the religious activity of Betty Simmons was injurious to no one
and collided with no other liberty, although at the previous term it had
struck down an ordinance prohibiting a method of proselyting which
did interfere seriously with the rights of others.38
To one who accepts the doctrine of the Murdock case, Justice Murphy's dissent seems wholly right. How then did the majority, without
repudiating that doctrine, arrive at an opposite result? The remarkable
construction of the statute by the Massachusetts court was the occasion
for the error, but not its justification. The Court was bound to accept
the construction of the statute, but not the construction of Betty Simmons' activities. It was not bound to regard these as child labor, simply
86

Id., 321 U.S. at 176, 177.
The majority here was identical with the majority in the Murdock case, except
for the substitution of Justice Reed for Justice Murphy.
38
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
87
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because the state court had so denominated them. In the Murdock and
Opelika cases it was confronted with holdings of state courts that the
distribution of religious literature in this way was a "commercial" activity; while it accepted the state courts' holdings that the ordinances
applied, it swept aside their characterization of the activities. But here
the words "child labor" had a more powerful effect upon the majority,
which apparently could not wholly escape the appeal of social legislation, even when the legislation was misapplied. Not only the text of
Justice Rutledge's opinion, but his citation 39 of an imposing array of
government documents and sociological publications on the evils of
child labor, betrays this influence. These seem quite irrelevant, for the
statute, as construed and applied, became in effect a narrowly-drawn
one, prohibiting the distribution of religious literature on the streets by
girls under eighteen and boys under twelve. If the majority had so
viewed it, the result might have been different, for there would have
been no room for indulgence in social predilections which could only
mislead. Of course there was no child labor here,4-0 and the majority
need not have been concerned for the future. 41 When child labor
masked as religion does appear, it is not to be supposed that the Court
will be incapable of detecting it. Onward, Christian Sol&ers is really
quite different from The Cry of the Children. 42
The conflict here between social legislation and religious freedom
was spurious,48 but when a real conflict does arise, it is not to be resolved
in this confused and not too careful fashion. If social legislation should
collide with the fundamental freedoms of the First Amendment, it
must be viewed with the same high degree of caution as the Court has
repeatedly said is necessary in the case of other legislation.44 Perhaps
89

See his footnotes 15 and 16, id., 321 U.S. at 168.
Justice Rutledge's opinion: "That evening, as Mrs. Prince was preparing
to leave her home, the children asked to go. She at first refused. Childlik~, they resorted to tears and, motherlike, she yielded." Id., 321 U.S. at 162.
41 Cf. the discussion of this decision in Boudin, "Freedom of Thought and Religious Liberty Under the Constitution," 4 LAWYERS Gu1Ln REVIEW, No. 3, 9 at
I 5 ( I 944): "Therefore, so far as the present Court is concerned, at least, there is no
danger that Child Labor Laws and similar social legislation may be broken down because of a claim that they interfere with the 'free exercise of religion.' "
°'2 Elizabeth Barrett Browning's poem (1843), which has had a continuing influence on the development of child labor legislation.
"8 Note, for example, that if Betty Simmons had given away her tracts, with no
"5c per copy'' sign on her hag, the statute by its terms would not have applied, nor
could one which did apply have been held valid. But it is difficult to see that the
threatened evils-such as they were-wouJd have been any the less.
44
See Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 at 161 ( 1939): "In every case,
therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights is asserted, the courts should be
4

° Cf.
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witli even more, when its primary concern is to protect the individual
from himself rather than to protect the rights of others, for history
shows the dangers of such governmental activity. The majority here
spoke ( erroneously but quite sincerely) in terms of Betty Simmons'
material welfare. Substitute "spiritual" for "material," and you have
the most common characteristic of religious persecutions (including the
Spanish Inquisition): a sincere desire to promote the welfare of the person affected-against his will.
The majority opinion seems also to have been influenced by doubt
as to the capacity of children to make a full and intelligent exercise of
religion. Parents may make martyrs of themselves, Justice Rutledge
said, but they "are not free to make martyrs of their children" before
they reach "the age of full and legal discretion," when they can choose
for themselves. 45 Passing by (as the Court did), the larger question,
why it is necessary to consider martyrdom at all, it must be observed
that this concept, despite an alluring resemblance to common sense, is
also negated by recorded experience. The First Amendment has no age
limits for these freedoms, and for an excellent reason. , It is not necessary to go back to the New Testament to discover that children have, as
they were enjoined by Christ to do, performed an extraordinarily vital
and powerful part in the exercise of religion, particularly in proselyting. The Catholic roll of saints does not lack children who began their
missions when younger than Betty Simmons. St. Agnes met martyrdom at thirte'en; St. Genevieve commenced her career at seven; St.
Stanislas Kostka, who died at eighteen, began his in very early childhood.46 Jeanne d' Arc first heard the voices at twelve, and her mission
was completed, her trial begun, while she was still eighteen. These may
s~em long ago, but the Grotto of Lourdes is quite modern and th:e heap
of crutches quite tangible: Bernadette was fourteen when the visions
first appeared. As for- other faiths, it may be noted that John Calvin
became a chaplain at twelve. Mary Baker Eddy first heard the "Voices"
at eight, and her first experience ·of, spiritual healing occurred at
twelve.47 This is a hasty catalog, but it should be sufficient. One may
regard all these faiths-and that of Jehovah's Witnesses also---as
astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation." This has been quoted and
applied in many later cases.
'
45 For comment on this passage, see 61 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 165 (1944).
46 See I BuTLER, THE LIVES OF THE FATHERS, MARTYRS AND OTHER PRINCIPAL
SAINTS 90 et seq., 17 et seq. (1844); and 3 id. 335 et seq.
47 See WILBUR, LIFE OF MARY BAKER EDDY 17, 28 et seq. (1938) which cites
EDDY, RETROSPECTION AND INTROSPECTION; see also 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
14th ed., 947.
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heresies, intellectual aberrations, not the true religion; one may even
consider that there is no true religion; but no one will deny that these
are all "religion" within the contemplation of the First Amendment.
The Court has from the beginning, notwithstanding the odd doctrines of Jehovah's Witnesses and their even more eccentric methods
of proselyting,48 recognized their sincerity and earnestness, and it did
so here. It is clear, therefore, that the nature of these beliefs and
methods did not contribute to the majority's view that Betty Simmons must wait until "the age of full and legal discretion" to become a
"martyr." But, while this cannot be supposed to have influenced the
Court, it perhaps had its influence in Massachusetts. It is at least improbable that a girl who sold The War Cry or sang at a Salvation
Army Christmas street meeting, would have encountered this rigorous
enforcement of the' statute; and the improbability becomes greater as
one progresses to well-established faiths. The case of Betty Simmons
was, as Justice Murphy implies, simply the latest example of the persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses "by the resurrection and enforcement
of little used ordinances and statutes." Whether they are called persecutions, or governmental restraint which reflects the will of the established majority, these measures are self-defeating; for the blood of
the martyrs is still the seed of the Church; and nothing could have
done more to promote the propagation of Jehovah's Witnesses than the
repressive measures applied to the sect.
The history of the First Amendment- freedoms in the Court has
been the triumph of the dissenting opinion. Justice Mµrphy stands
alone here, as Chief Justice Stone did in the first flag salute case.49
There would perhaps be equal reason to anticipate the ultimate triumph
of his view, if the question presented here were to be heard by 'the
Court again. It will be unfortunate if the majority opinion is permitted
to remain, unreversed and unmodified, because of lack of challenge.

Follett v. lylcCormick
Two months later the Court, in Follett v. McCormick,5° held that
a license tax ordinance essentially similar to those in the Murdock and
Opelika cases, was void, when applied to a Jehovah's Witness. The
distributor here was engaged in "preaching the gospel" by going "from
48

The doctrines, and for that matter the methods of proselyting, appear to be a
return to primitive Christianity. See McCown, "Conscience v. The State," 32 CAL.
L. REv. l at 22-23, 28-29 (1944).
49
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 at 601 (1940).
50
321 U.S. 573 (1944).
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house to house presenting the gospel of the kingdom in printed form."
He derived his living from the contributions received, having no other
source of income. Justice Douglas, for the majority, remarked that
"preachers of the more orthodox faiths are not engaged in commercial
undertakings because they are dependent on their callings for a livelihood." That the preacher here was not an itinerant ( as in the Murdock
case) was immaterial, for "he who makes a profession of evangelism is
not in a less preferred position than the casual worker." 51 The ordinance, as construed and applied, was held to abridge the free exercise of
religion.
, Justice Reed (who had dissented vigorously in the Murdock case)
·concurred in a separate opinion.. The Murdock and Opelika decisions
were now the law of the land, and he could "see no difference in respect
to an exercise of religion between an itinerant distributor and one who
remains in one general-neighborhood or between one who is active part
time and another who is active all of his time...." Justice Murphy,
also concurring separately, denied that the decision contained "startling
implications with respect to freedom of speech and the press." 52
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson, dissenting, regarded
the decision as extending and reaching beyond the Murdock case.
Follett, a citizen of the community in which he earned his living by this
activity-"street vending"-was being accorded exemption from the
excise "which all others similarly si~ated must pay"; as a result he
"will enjoy a subsidy for his religion." If the First Amendment grants
immunity from taxation to the exercise of religion, they said, "it must
equally grant a similar exemption to those who speak and to the press.
It will not do to say that the Amendment, in the clause relating to religion, is couched in the imperative and, in the clause relating to freedom of speech and of press, is couched in the comparative. The Amendment's prohibitions are equally sweeping. If exactions on the business
or occupation of selling cannot be- enforced against Jehovah's Witnesses
they can no more be enforced against publishers or vendors of books,
whether dealing with religion or other matters of information." 58 Even
in the field of religion alone, they added, the implications of the decision were startling, for "multiple activities by which citizens earn their
bread may, with equal propriety, be denominated an exercise of religion
as may preaching or se!Hng religious tracts."
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578, 579.
Id. at 581-582. Cf. Justice Rutledge's similar suggestion in Prince v. Massachusetts, commenting upon the absence of any claim of violation of freedom of the press.
51

52
53
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The First Amendment does not place the free exercise of religion
upon a part-time basis, and, as Justice Reed observes, there is visible
distinction between the actual decision here and that in the Murdock
case. But the debate here, echoing that of the previous term, contains
a matter of importance. In the Murdock case, Justice Douglas had,
perhaps too broadly,54 held the ordinance void as an invasion both of
the free exercise of religion and of freedom of the press; here his
opinion is rested only upon the former. The minority, thus deprived of
the direct attack to which the Murdock opinion was open, now deny
that the free exercise of religion can claim anything more than freedom
of the press. But it is not necessary to give a higher place to one freedom than the other; place them upon the same plane, and still it by.no
means follows that whichever freedoi:n is invoked, the result attained
must be the same. The same measure which abridges the free exercise
of religion may, not only economically but otherwise, be insufficient to
abridge freedom of the press. Here, for example, the ordinance obviously places much greater restraint upon the preacher, Follett, than it
would upon the commercial press ( assuming that it were ever enforced
against the latter). It may be true also that a measure which abridges
freedom of the press will, having regard to all the circumstances of its
application, be insufficient to abridge the free exercise of religion. It is
not a question of giving higher place to one freedom than the other;
it is a question of the scope of each freedom, of selecting the one which
has in actual fact been overburdened and thus invaded.

United States v. Ballard
While it involves the assertion of religious freedom against the
Federal Government and hence is not within this field, United States
v. Ballard 55 is noteworthy because of the character of the ·questions
presented. The respondents were indicted and convicted for using the
mail~ to defraud. They were charged with organizing and promoting
the "I Am" movement, by means of false representations that they
were "divine messengers" selected by the "divine entity Saint Germain" and that they had, by reason of supernatural attainments, power
to heal persons affiicted with any diseases or injuries; these representations being, it was charged, made with knowledge of their falsity and
with the intention of defrauding others of their money and property.
The district court withdrew from the jury the question of the truth or
H See Green, "Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 28 WASH. UNIV.
L. Q. 251 at 259-260 (1943).
55
322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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falsity of respondents' ,religious doctrines, but submitted ,the issue of
their "belief. in their representations and promises." The circuit court
of appeals reversed the conviction and granted a new trial, holding that
whether the representations were false or true was a question which
should have been submitted to the jury. 56 Respondents' position now,
as stated by the Court, was that the trial court "should have gone the
whole way" and withheld from the jury "both that issue and the issues
of their good faith," on the basis of the First Amendment.
Justice Douglas, for the majority of five, had no doubt that the
First Amendment precluded the submission to the jury of the truth or
verity of the religious doctrines. "Men may believe what they cannot
proye," he remarked, 57 and there would be little left of religious freedom if a believer in the New Testament could be sent to jail because a
jury in a hostile environment found its mirades and teachings false.
Under the First Amendment one need "answer to no man for the verity
of his religious views." 58 If the truth of respondents' views might be
submitted to a jury, then the same could be done with the religious
beliefs of any. sect. The Court held that the district court had ruled
properly in withholding this question from the jury, and ordered the
case remanded to the circuit court of appeals so that it might pass on
"the other constitutional. issues which respondents claim to have reserved."
.
Chief Justice Stone, speaking for himself and Justices Roberts and
Frankfurter, dissented. Religious freedom, he considered, no more
afforded immunity from prosecution for fraud than for polygamy or
libel. He could not say that freedom of worship included "freedom to
procure money by making knowingly false statements about one's religious experiences." 59 The state of one's mind, he said, is a fact as
capable of fraudulent misrepresentation as is one's physical condition or
the state of his bodily health; and it was irrelevant "whether the religious experiences alleged did or did not in fact occur, or whether that
issue could or could not, for constitutional reasons, have been rightly
, submitted to the jury." 60 He considered that the jury had properly
rendered a verdict of guilty and that the judgment of conviction should
be reinstated.
58
United States v. Ballard, (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 540. One judge
dissented.
57 Id., 322 U.S. at 86.
58
Id. at 87. ,
59
Id; at 89.
80 Id. at 90. He said elsewhere: "In any event I see no occasion for making any
pronouncement on this subject in the present case." Id. at 89.
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Justice Jackson dissented separately in an opinion as engaging as
any in recent years.
"I should say the defendants have done just that fo; which
they are indicted. If I might agree to their conviction without
creating a precedent, I cheerfully would do so. I can see in their
teachings nothing but humbug, untainted by any trace of truth.
But that does not dispose of the constitutional question whether
misrepresentation of religious experience or belief is prosecutable;
it rather emphasizes the danger of such prosecutions." 61
He did not see "how we can separate an issue as to what is believed
from considerations as to what is believable," for the most convincing
proof of one's belief in his statements is to show their truth in his experience, and the best proof that one knowingly falsified is to show
"that what he said happened never did happen." How could the Government prove respondents "knew something to be false which it cannot prove to be false?" Further, any inquiry into intellectual honesty in
religion raised profound psychological problems, for religious experiences "cannot be verified to the minds of those whose field of consciousness does not include religious insight." Nor did he know, Justice Jackson said, "what degree of skepticism or disbelief in a religious representation amounts to actionable fraud." Such inquiries may discomfort
orthodox as well as unconventional religious teachers, who solicit gifts
or legacies, "for even the most regular of them are sometimes accused
of taking their orthodoxy with a grain of salt." If the members of "I
Am" "get comfort from the celestial guidance of their Saint Germain,"
it was hard to say that they did not get what they paid for. The real
harm done by false prophets was not financial, but on the mental and
spiritual plane, for delusion and disillusionment are followed by cynicism and confusion. But that, Justice Jackson consid~red, "is precisely
the thing the Constitution puts beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for
the price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we
must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish." Prosecutions of this character easily might degenerate into religious persecution. "I would dismiss the indictment," he concluded, "and have done
with this business of judicially examining other people's faiths." 62
The majority held that the issue of truth or falsity of the religious
doctrines and experiences was not for the jury, but it was inconclusive
as to the issue of good faith; Chief Justice Stone, Justices Roberts and
61

o2

Id. at 92.
Id. at 94, 95.
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Frankfurter, considered that the issue of truth was quite irrelevant,
but that good faith was for the jury's determination; Justice Jackson's
view was that neither· issue was for the jury. The difficulty of the case
is demonstrated both by the diversity of the opinions and by the persuasiveness of each. It is not difficult to determine the issue of truth or
falsity of religious beliefs, as to which there was no actual disagreement
in the Court. Even if there appeared to be a necessity for it ( and there
does not here), matters of this sort ought not to be opened to the inquiry of a jury, in the face of the First Amendment. But as to the issue
of good faith, there is no such easy answer. There is something in what
Justice Jackson so strikingly says, but there seems to be not enough.
What his view amounts to is that fraud masked as religion must be protected in order to protect religion. 63 The implication is that the dividing
line between the two is not only not readily discernible, but sometimes
virtually invisible. It would be pleasant to "have done with this business
of judicially examining other people's faiths," but if by that is meant
the business of examining, not the truth of the religion, but the genuineness of the belief in it, the Court can never have done with that so
long as enforcement of the First Amendment remains necessary. If
the freedom guaranteed to the exercise 0£ religion is to survive,
it must be restricted, somehow, to those who ·genuinely believe and
exercise their religion under the inexorable compulsion of their belief.
Neither fraud, nor child labor, nor any secular enterprise becomes entitled to this freedom by simply putting on the dress of religion. 64
Nothing could be niore devastating to real religion than the implication
mentioned above; nor could anything be more destructive to religious
freedom, in the long run, than to extend its immunities to whomever
claimed them, without enquiry when the claim appeared fraudulent.
And the enquiry is perhaps not so difficult as Justice Jackson fears.
63

There is a surprising resemblance betwee; his view here and his opinion, for the
majority, two weeks earlier, in Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 64 S. Ct. 792 (1944).
There a Florida statute, making it a misdemeanor to induce advances of money or
property "with intent to defraud," by a promise to perform labor, was held void as in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. It penalized "a misrepresentation of the
present intent or state of mind of the laborer," and Justice Jackson conceded that there
µiight be not only actual but provable fraud in such matters. Nevertheless the Court
(Chief Justice Stone and Justice Reed dissenting) preferred to run the risk of protecting fraud rather than the risk of permitting peonage.
64
Cf. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous court in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 at 306 (1940): "Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to
imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds
upon the public. Certainly penal laws are available to punish such conduct."
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Courts and juries have to determine every day whether some one had
an intent to defraud. Over and over again, in the Jehovah's Witnesses
cases, the Court has remarked upon the sincerity with which the beliefs
were held. It got that from the record. 65 One can doubt the belief without doubting the believer. Indeed, we all do this with faiths other
than our own.
The decisions of the term thus add nothing to the development of
protection of the free exercise of religion: the Follett case (and for that
matter the Ballard case also) added little if anything; and Prince v.
Massachusetts not only took something away from the Murdock doctrine, but perhaps left the whole structure in some danger from a new
quarter. It has been evident for some time that freedom of speech and
of the press were, notwithstanding the early Communist cases, now
more seriously threatened from the liberal side than from the conservative.66 Prince v. Massachusetts may, however unnecessarily, foreshadow a similar ( although more remote) threat to the free exercise
of religion.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS

Following the inclusion of freedom of speech and of the press in
liberty, in 1925,61 their development had been so rapid that by 1941
it was possible for Justice Frankfurter to say that "in a series of opinions
as uncompromising as any in its history, this Court has settled that the
fullest opportunities for free discussion are 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment' protected against attempted invasion by the States." 68 The first decisions
had protected utterances of a political character; but the Court, quickly
moving beyond this, had made it clear that the scope of the First
Amendment's guaranty was general, and not at all conditioned upon
the subject of the utterance.69 At the moment when Justice Frankfurter
spoke it seemed, indeed, that consideration of the status of these free65

Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 at 612-613 (1942), illustrates the process.

66 See note 109, below, collecting recent holdings of circuit courts of appeal that
orders of the National Labor Relations Board have invaded the employer's freedom of
speech, and that an injunction sought by the Wage and Hour Administrator under
specific provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act violated freedom of the press.
67
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See note 4.
68 In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 at 281-282 (1941).
69 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444 (1936); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S.
147 (1939). See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S\ 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931).
II
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dams might for the future be largely confined to the clear and present
danger test. 7°
But in 1942 a unanimous Court~ through Justice Roberts, said, in
Valentine v. Chrestensen,11 that, while the streets were "proper places
for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion," which privilege might not be unduly burdened or
proscribed, the Court was "equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." 12 The holding appears to be that the protection of the First
Amendment does not in any wise extend to "commercial advertising,"
presumably because this is tainted by the profit motive. The Court's
subsequent references to this decision have been most cautious; there
were none at the 1943 term.
The concept of areas of speech which were within the protection of
the First Amendment, necessarily implying that there were other areas
which were not, had been expressed for the first time in I 940, in Thornhill v. Alabama,78 where it was simply incidental to the holding that
peaceful picketing was the communication of information and hence entitled to the constitutional protection. There Justice Murphy, speaking
for eight members of the Court,74 had said ( with a supporting argument
based upon the "importance" of "satisfactory hours and wages and
working conditions in industry") :
"In the circumstances of our, times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded
as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution." 75
As used here, this was preceded by a sentence which to an extent
qualified itf 76 but the qualification, inadequate and subjective though it ·
was, was omitted when the "area" proposition was later repeated or

.

70

Discussed below.
316 U.S. 52, 62 S. Ct. 920 (1942). For criticism of the decision, see 27
WASH, UNiv. L. Q. 497 at 559 (1942); 28 WASH, UNIV. L. Q. 251 at 254 (1943).
72
316 U.S.
at 54 (1942).
73
310 U.S. 88 at 102-103, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
74 All but Justice McReynolds, who dissented without opinion.
75
310 U.S. 88 at 102 (1940).
76 "Freedom of discussion •.. must embrace all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enaBle the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
their period." Id., 310 U.S. at 102.
71
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paraphrased. 11 The expression was well intended; being used to support
the freedom in the particular case; but it was inherently dangerous, for
placing utterances regarding labor disputes in a preferred position automatically places other speech in either an inferior or an excluded position. Of course the First Amendment protects all speech. The protection is defeasible by the balancing of social interests which in a given
case may justify abridgment; but no higher constitutional value can be
given to one sort of speech than to another. To limit the freedom to
speech on such subjects--and in such directions--as a majority of the
Court may from time to time regard with favor, is to destroy it. Those
utterances seldom require protection from the amendment.78 And
"freedom for the thought that we hate" 79 must certainly include freedom for the thought which wholly disinterests us, which w,:; regard as
utterly trivial.

Cafete;ia Employees' Union v. Angelos
The only decision in this field at the r943 term so was Cafeteria
Employees' Union v. Angelos. 81 Here a unanimous Court, through
Justice Frankfurter, reversing a New York decree, held that a union's
picketing of a cafeteria ( whose ·owners operated it without employees}
"in an attempt to organize it," could not, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, be enjoined. The pickets were "ord~rly and peaceful,"
77
In Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 at u3, 60 S. Ct. 746 (1940); by
Justice Black, dissenting, in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, •312
U.S. 287 at 303, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941); by Justice Douglas, concurring, in Bakery and
Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 at 776, 62 S. Ct. 816 (1942); and by Justice
Black, dissenting, and Justice Reed, dissenting, in Carpenters & Joiners Union v.
Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 at 730, 734, 62 S. Ct. 807 (1942). Justice Frankfurter,
who has spoken for the Court in all but one of the picketing cases since the Carlson
case, has carefully avoided this language.
78
They required it here and in some of the other picketing cases, but even so,
"seldom".
79
Justice Holmes, dissenting, in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 at
655, 49 S. Ct. 448 (1929).
so Thomas v. Collins, (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 1282, dealing with the constitutionality of the Texas statute requiring registration (non-discretionary and without
license fee) of labor union organizers, was on the last day of the term ordered reargued at the 1944 term, six questions being set out for the reargument. For the
background of the case, see "R. J. Thomas Case in Supreme Court," 4 LAWYERS GUILD
REV. No. 1, p. 47 (1944). For a summary of the argument at the 1943 term, see 12
U.S. LAW WEEK 3363 (1944). Counsel for Thomas made full use of the "area"
argument of the Thornhill case.
81
320 U.S. 293 (1943). For incisive comment on this case, see 42 MICH. L.
REV. 706 (1944).
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but they carried signs that the cafeteria was "unfair to organized labor,"
and that the pickets had been formerly employed there ( which the
court below treated as "knowingly false"). The pickets also told prospective customers that the cafeteria "served bad food," and that by
patronizing it they "were aiding the cause of Fascism." "To use loose
language or undefined slogans that are part of the conventional givearid-take in our economic and political controversies-like 'unfair' and
'fascist'-," said Justice Frankfurter, "is not to falsify facts." 82 As the
right to free speech in the future could not be forfeited because of disassociated acts of past violence, still less could "the right to picket itself be taken away merely because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of violence." 88 He added by way of
dictum: "Ip. a setting like the present, continuing representations unquestionably false ... are of course not constitutional prerogatives." 8 ¾
The decision seems right, as do-with one- exception 85-all the
earlier decisions protecting picketing as free speech.86 To some the
process described as "give-and-take" may seem to be nowadays hardly
so bilateral; 87 and one may regard calling a man "fascist," when
he is not, as not only false but defamatory. 88 Near v. Minnesota 89
(not cited by Justice Frankfurter) had, however, seemed to settle, and
settle ·rightly, that the continued- publication of libels could not be
enjoined. The person defamed may sue for damages, but that is all;
82

320 U.S." 293 at 295 (1943).
Id. at 296.
84
Id. at 295.
85
Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942). There, in a
situation like the Angelos case, secondary picketing was held immune from injunction.
Application of the clear and present danger test would in my opinion have produced
a different result.
86
For admirable di;cussion of these cases, presenting a wide variety of views, the
reader is referred to Jaffe, "In Defense of the Supreme Court's :Picketing Doctrine," 41
. MxcH. L ..REv. 1037 (1943); Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 HARV. L.
REv. 180 (1942); Dodd, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 HARV. L. REv.
513 (1943); and Teller, "A Reply," 56 HARV. L. REv. 532 (1943).
87
The expression m~st have surprised the cafeteria owners here, who appear to
have been solely on the receiving end.
88
Certainly this is defamatory when uttered since Pearl Harbor, if it was not
before. See 3 ToRTS RESTATEMENT§ 559, p. 141, Illustration 2 at p. 142 (1938).
"Unfair to organized labor," when false, has also been held libelous per se. Consolidated Terminal Corp. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union, (D.C., Dist. Col.
1940), 33 F. Supp. 645. But one must agree with Justice Frankfurter's.implication
that this has now become virtually meaningless. See Emide v. San Joaquin County
Central Labor Council, 23 Cal. (2d) 146, 143 P. (2d) 20 (1943).
89
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
88
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this is part of the price of the freedoms. While the dictum quoted
seems, therefore, surprising,90 it does not affect the merits of the dec1s1on.
But in one respect this case is arresting. Viewed as the end product
of "free trade in ideas," 91 as the latest and highest development of
what Justice Murphy referred to in the Thornhill case as "free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes," 92 the information here communicated by the pickets seems a
little lacking. These epithets seem hardly to possess the quality of being "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of
popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society," 93 which Justice Murphy there relied on to give to utterances
regarding labor disputes a preferred position under the First Amendment. If there were to be preferred place for any sort of speech, this
vituperation does not seem to possess even as much social value as the
"commercial advertising" which Mr. Chrestensen sought to distribute
on the streets in I 940, in an effort to induce New Yorkers to view his
S-49 submarine and to consider the merits of his controversy with the
Department of Docks regarding it. 94 If "commercial advertising" is
barred from the shelter of the First Amendment because of a profit
motive, surely that tainted the picketing here at least as much, for the
Angelos case, like Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 96 and American
Federation of Labor v. Swing,9° is a plain case of a union's attempt to
develop additional revenue and strengthen its position by picketing an
entrepreneur who has no employees and needs none, or whose einployees, wholly satisfied with their working conditions, are unwilling
to join the union.
The truth is that not only does the First Amendment forbid the
marking out of preferred "areas," but that at the time of the Thornhill
90

The omitted language in the dictum "and acts of coercion going beyond the
mere influence exerted by the fact of picketing" would of course explain it, if what
was in mind was false representations coupled with such acts of coercion.
91
Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 630,
40 S. Ct. 17 (1919).
92
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 103, 104-105 (1940).
98
Id., 310 U.S. at 103.
94 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 3 I 6 U.S. 52, 62 S. Ct. 920 ( l 942) ; Chrestensen
v. Valentine, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 5II; Chrestensen v. Valentine, (D. C.,
N.Y. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 596. For a view contrary to the suggestion above, see Dodd,
"Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 at 516 (1943).
95
315 U.S. 769 (1942).
96
312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568 (1941).
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case the social considerations on which Justice Murphy relied in thus
favoring labor picketing no longer existed. The moral and intellectual
bankruptcy of picketing, disclosed quite plainly here, was visible in
r 940. Picketing had not then progressed to the deliberate suppression
of freedom of speech and of the press-that did nqt occur, on any noteworthy scale, until 1943 97-but even in 1940 there was seldom any information which a picket could disseminate with ·advantage to his cause.
All that was left to the picket was abuse a~d intimidation. By 1940 "unfair to organized labor" no longer meant anything to the public, nor, for
that rriatter, to many members of organized labor. "Labor disputes," as
defined by the Court, were, more often than not, no longer between
an employer and his employees, but between two competing unions, or
between an employer and his employees on one hand and a union attempting to "muscle in" on the other.98 It was not accidental that, in
four of the five cases in which, since the date of the Thornhill decision,
the Court has dealt with picketing as free speech, the pickets were not
striking employees or former employees of the enterprise picketed.99
It was over this modern picketing that the Thornhill language placed a
superannuated halo.
For the Court in t{le Thornhill case was expressing a philosophy of
the past, precisely as it had too often done in dealing with labor matters. When in r 90 5, in Lochner v. New, Y ot"k,100 the Court struck down
a New York statute regulating hours of labor, Justice Holmes reminded
it that "The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics"; 101 but when the new Court struck down the Alabama
statute in the Thornhill case by virtue of the same Amendment, there
was no reminder that the developments of the previous decade had
97 Picketing of the New York World-Telegram and the Los Angeles Times by
the National Maritime Union in an effort to suppress the publication of Westbrook
Pegler's column. In New York the picketing was by 2000 union members, and the
union voted to maintain this picket line permanently in front of the World-Telegram·
building. NEw YoRK TIMES, Aug. 20, 1943, 16:2; Aug. 21, 1943, 24:4; Sept. 18,
1943, 30:8.
98
In the Swing case the employees joined their employer in seeking an injunction
against the picketing.
99
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Bakery and
Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 ( l 942); and the Angelos case. The sole except~on is Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941),
where, as it ·happened, the Court denied protection.
100
198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
101 Id. at 75.
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reduced, if not eliminated, the social value of picketing.102 The Thornhill opinion reflected perfectly the impelling circumstances of the first
quarter of the century, when labor was the under.dog in the economic
struggle, desperately in need of this protection ( which was then denied
it). But "the circumstances of our times" were quite different. Remedial legislation had, well before I 940, placed organized labor in a position superior to employers, considering that all the power of government supported it. The Railway Labor Act,103 the Norris-LaGuardia Act,104 the National Labor. Relations Act,105 the Fair Labor
Standards Act,106 and social security legislation as well as a great body
of lesser legislation, both federal and state,107 were being enforced with
the utmost vigor. The Anti-Racketeering Act 108 had even excepted
from its penalties certain types of activity by labor unions. Perhaps
even more than this legislation, the change in social viewpoints, of
which it was the result, had metamorphosed the scene of the struggle.
By r940 the social and economic views of Justice Brandeis were not
without acceptance in industry. By r940 unions could inform the public of their side of a controversy by means other than picketing, such as
newspaper advertising and handbills, often as easily as their adversaries, for with very few exceptions a union's financial resources were
as great as those of the enterprises which it picketed. And organized
labor, if still a minority in r940, was certainly as powerful politically
as any organization of employers, or the unorganized majority. Labor
had become the top dog, and it was the employer who now urgently
sought protection for his freedom of speech, without, however, receiving any help from the "area" statement of the Thornhill case.109 The
102
Cf. Jaffe, "In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine," 41 M1cH.
L. REV. 1037 at 1049 (1943).
103
44 Stat. L. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. (1940) § 151 et seq.
104
47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § IOI et seq.
105
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 151 et seq,
106
52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 201 et seq.
107
For discussion of contempor:iry state labor legislation, see Smith and DeLancey,
"The State Legislatures and Unionism," 38 M1cH. L. REV. 987 (1940).
108
48 Stat. L. 979 (1934), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 42oa-e.
•
109
When the Court had to deal with the employer's freedom of speech, in NLRB
v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 62 S. Ct. 344 (1941), and in Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 63 S. Ct. 1214 (1943), it made
no reference to the Thornhill "area.'' The National Labor Relations Board having
since made some ingenious efforts to avoid the constitutional guaranty [see e.g., In re
Peter J. Schweitzer, Inc., 54 N.L.R.B. 813, 830-831 (1944)], circuit courts of
appeal have been obliged recently to set aside a number of orders by the board which
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Court, a late convert to the new social views, had changed, but so had
the contemporary scene, earlier; and thus ~ new Court became the prisoner of a new past.110
The picture may be a little overdrawn, but not, I think, too much so.
The Court's decisions in matters affecting labor, from Lochner to
Thornhill (and indeed these limits might be extended) must often
induce regret, because their common characteristic is an inability to
perceive contemporary reality.111 In the Thornhill case the Court fell
into a new error, but by a very ancient process. In the rights of labor,
the pendulum has had a long rise; the Court, even if it is not to be
a drag upon the pendulum, ought not to add an unnatural violence,
to push its swing beyond an orbit perhaps . already far enough extended. Nor has the Court's prestige ever been increased by doubt con<:erning its ability to give contemporary answers to contemporary questions. And labor itself has suffered, indirectly but almost immediately,
by the excesses for. which the Thornhill opinion has some measure of
responsibility.
Justice Frankfurter has to an extent rescued the Court from its
~hralldom to old concepts, not merely hr. avoiding the Thornhill language in the later picketing cases in.which he has spoken for the Court,
but by bringing it face to face with present reality in Jvf.ilk Wagon
invaded the employer's right of free speech. NLRB v. Citizen-News Co.~ (C.C.A. 9th,
1943) 134 F. {2d) 970; NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943)
134 F. {2d) 993, cert. denied, 320 _U.S. 768, 64 S. Ct. 84 (1944); NLRB v. BrownBrockmeyer Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 537; Edw. G. Budd Manufacturing
Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 3d, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 922, cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778, 64
S. Ct. 619 (1944). See also Sun Publishing Co. v. Walling, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 140
F. (2d) 445, cert. denied, (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 946, where an injunction sought
by the Wage and Hour Administrator under specific provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act was held to violate freedom of the press.
In the Budd case, for the first time, the Thornhill "area" was used to support
an employer's freedom of speech.
110 A British court was able to escape this fate. See I. W. Holdsworth, Ltd. v.
Associated Newspapers, 3 AU Eng. R. 872, 53 T. L. R. 1029 at 1033 (C.A. 1937),
where Scott, L. J., concurring, said: "In April, 1936, when this paragraph was published, the political and social conditions of industry in Great Britain were very different from what they had been in the Victorian days of industrialism and laissez-foire,
and a corresponding change had taken place in public opinion."
111 Judge Hutcheson has contrasted the steadiness with which Justice Holmes
maintained his attitude of judicial tolerance of legislative policy "with the Bourbonism
and class consciousness of the decisions from which he was constantly dissenting''
(citing the Lochner case) "and the Jacobinism and class consciousness on the other side
of some of the recent decisions of the Court" (citing the Thornhill and Swing cases).
Book Review, 30 A.B.A.J. 106-107 (1944).
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Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies.112 But in these cases he has
avoided mention of the clear and present danger test as carefully as he
has the Thornhill "area," even though application of this test would
(in my judgment) almost always have produced the same result.
There seems to be no sufficient reason for the Court to proceed with
picketing laboriously, in piecemeal fashion, with complete disregard of
the uniform standard which it has held applies equally to the suppression of picketing and to the suppression of other speech.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

The clear and present danger rule had its origin in 19 l 9, in the
well-known dictum of Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,118
the first of the Espionage Act cases to reach the Court. It was subsequently expanded, in a notable series of dissenting opinions, by Justice
Holmes and in particular by Justice Brandeis, reaching its highest development in the latter's dissent in Whitney v. California. 114 Ten years
later, in 1937, it was for the first time applied (although in incomplete
terms) by a majority of the Court, Justice Roberts, for five members,
making use of it in Herndon v. Lowry.115 From this time on the rule
was used frequently, reaching in Bridges v. California,116 in 1941, almost the peak of development which it had attained in Justice Brandeis'
dissent in the Whitney case. In the Bridges case Justice Black, for the
,, five-to-four majority, presented clear and present danger as "a working
principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished," adding that even this did not "mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression." 117 This is perhaps another
112

312 U.S. 287 (1941).

us "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such cir-

cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree." 249 U.S. 47 at 52, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919).
For the history of the rule and some appraisal of its value to the First Amendment
freedoms, see 27 WAsH. UNiv. L. Q. 497 at 539-562 (1942).
114
274 U.S. 357 at 372, 377, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927). Even imminent danger
could not justify repression, Justice Brandeis considered, unless the evil apprehended
was "relatively serious," for prohibition of free speech was a measure too stringent to
be appropriate as the means for averting "a relatively trivial harm to society," and a
statute might be unconstitutional "merely because the remedy, although effective as
means of protection, is unduly harsh or oppressive."
115
301 U.S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732 (1937).
116
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
117
Id. at 263.
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way of saying that in the balancing of. interests there must be placed in
the scales, against the social value of the governmental abridgment, a
heavy ( and uniform) weight representing the absolute value of the
freedom, apart from and in addition to the social value of speech in the
particular case.
,
' On the other hand, it must be noted that in the Bridges case the
rule received from Justice Frankfurter ( speaking also for Chief Justice
Stone and Justices Roberts and Byrnes) its first direct attack since
Gitlow v. New York, 118 sixteen years earlier. Justice Frankfurter, who
had until now been silent with respect to clear and present danger, renewed the effort to limit the rule in 1943 in his dissent in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette.119
It is true that, while Justices Holmes and Brandeis said that the
rule applied "in every case,~' all of the cases in which they spoke of
clear and present danger were cases of political utterances (by socialists, communists, syndicalists or pro-Germans). Commencing in 1940,
however, the Court had extended the rule successively to picketing,120
to religious utterances,121 and to utterances punished as contempt of
court.122 In Herndon v. Lowry 128 the Court had already extended the
rule to another freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment, freedom
of assembly, but its application to the free exercise of religion seemed
curiously delayed. In the Barnette case Justice Jackson struck down the
flag salute requirement as an invasion of the freedom of silence rather
than of religious liberty, but he nevertheless included "freedom of worship" as one of the rights which might be ,restricted "only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully
protect," 124 a dictum which seemed to be supported by at least three
justices. At the 1943 term Prince v. Massachusetts 125 apparently established, although still only by dictum, that clear and present danger was
to be applied to suppression of the free exercise of religion, with the
same force as to suppression of the other First Amendment liberties.
118

268 U.S. 652 (1925).
319 U.S. 624 at 646, 662-663 (1943).
120
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
121
Cantwell v, Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
122
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
128
301
242 (1937).
124
319 U.S. 624 at 639 (1943).
125
321 U.S. 158 (1944). Justice Rutledge, for the majority, stated the rule and
made an effort to satisfy its requirements; and Justice Murphy's dissent was quite explicit.
·
119

:u.s.
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If this can be taken as established, it may be of the highest importance
to the development of this freedom.
' Aside from this, there was no development of the rule during the
term. The silence with respect to the rule in Follett v. McCormick1 26
indicates that the Court continues to regard it as applicable only to outright suppression of the freedom, not to the licensing, or taxing, or
otherwise burdening of it. In H(frtzel v. United States, 1 '1-7 the first
Espionage Act prosecution to reach the Court during the present war,
Justice Murphy, speaking for four members of the Court, made brief
reference to the rule; but the case passed off on the issue pf intent. The
silence of Chief Justice Stone with regard to clear and present danger
remained unbroken through the term.128
RIGHTS

pF

THE AccusED IN C:RIMI,NAL PROSECUTIONS

When in I 92 5 freedom of speech and of th.e press were included
within the "liberty" of the due process clause, it was at once suggested
that logic might compel the inclusion also in liberty, not only of the
other First Amendment freedoms, but of other rights guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, particularly the rights of the accused in• criminal
prosecutions, which the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments protected against federal denial.129 In 1932, in Powell v. AlabMna,180 the
Court, influenced by the earlier inclusion of freedom of exptession, held
that the right to the assistance of counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, was, in the particular situation there presented, protected by the due process clause against state denial. The Court spoke
of this right as part of procedural due process, rather than of liberty,
but its subsequent statement 131 that the right to counsel had "been
126
121
128

321 U.S. 573 (1944).
(U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 1233.

Perhaps mention should be made of Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 64
S. Ct. 346 (1944), where Justice Murphy, dissenting from a holding tliat judicial review of a draft board's classification was, under the circumstances there, not authorized
by the statute, said:
''We assent to . . . temporary suspension [ of individual rights] only to the extent
that they constitute a clear and present danger to the effective prosecu,tion of the
war...." (p. 556).
.
129
Warren, ''The New 'Liberty' Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 HARV.
L. 'REv. 431 at 458-461 (1926).
130
287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932). See 27 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 497 at 529535 ( 1942), for more detailed consideration of the cases here discussed.
131
In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325, 324-325, 58 S. Ct. 149
(1937). A little earlier the Court had said, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 at 243-244 (1936), that in Powell v. Alabama: "We concluded that certain
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found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" was essentially
true. However, in 1942 the Court, in Betts v. Brady,132 a six-to-three
decision, held that the due process clause did not protect this right
except when, in a particular case, a -fair trial could not be had without
it, that this right was "not a fundamental right, essential to a fair
trial." 183
The "Fair Trial Rule," which emerged victorious in its first clash 184
with the concept that the sp~cific rights of the Bill of Right~ were protected by the due process clause, had its origin in cases where a trial,
though super~cially conforming to due process, was simply a mask for a
conviction due to mob influence, to public passion, or to perjured testimony.185 But at the 1941 term 186 the rule, with its concomitant "independent examination of the record," received so extensive development
as to place upon the Court a burden which seemed perhaps beyond its
capacity.187 Having reached this point, it was promptly turned against
the right to the aiq. of counsel, in contrast to its original •function, which
had been to add something to the Bill of Rights, to insure that the
rights there guaranteed were accorded in fact, not simply in form.
In 1934 the Court had, in Snyder 'V. Massachusetts, 188 dealt, on the
fundamental rights, safeguarded by the 1i.rst eight amendments against federal action,
were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid
of counsel in a criminal prosecution." This opinion was by Justice Sutherland, who·
had written the majority opinion in the Powell case,
182 316 U.S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252 (1942).
183 Jd. at 471.
184 ln Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
135 See Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Frank v. Mangum; 237 U.S. 309 at
345, 35 S. Ct. 582 (1915); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265 (1923);
and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340 (1935).
186 ln Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), and Hysler v. Florida, 315
U.S. 411, 62 S. Ct. 688 (1942).
137 Cf. Justice Black's reference, in his dissent in Betts v. Brady, 3 I 6 U.S. 45 5 at
4 7 5 ( 1942}, to «the prevailing view of due process ••• ·a view which gives this Court
such vast supervisory powers that I am not inclined to accept it without grave doubts."
In addition, it may be suggested that the rule as now developed opens the door to
arbitrary and purely subjective judgment, unrestrained by any standard, in contrast to
the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights for the requirements which it regarded as
essential to a fair trial; that it leaves all state couri:s uncertain of their powers and
duties; and that it depr!ves persons accused of crime of any assurance or indeed any
precise knowledge of their rights.
138 291 U.S. 97, 54 S. Ct. 330 (1934). Justice Cardozo, for the majority, said
(at 106): "For present purposes we assume that the privilege is reinforced by the
Fourteenth Amendment, though this has not been squarely held." Justice Roberts (in
whose dissenting opinion Justices Brandeis, Sutherland and Butler concurred) said
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whole not unfavorably, with protection of another right guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment-the right of the accused to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. Three years later, in Palko v. Co111t.1,ecticut,189
the Court, speaking through Justice Cardozo, used perhaps excessive
care to refrain from ,deciding whether or not a state might subject an
accused to the double jeopardy prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
The Court's handling of self-incrimination had been more decisive.
In 1936, in Brown v. Mississippi,140 it reversed a conviction which
rested upon a confession extorted by brutality and violence, holding
that the use of such a confession was a denial of due process. In Chambers v. Florida,14J. in 1940, it held that use of a confession obtained by
questioning over a period of five days was a denial of due process. It
progressed rapidly from that to Justice Roberts' dictum in Eisenba v.
Calif9rnia,142 that "the concept of due process would void a trial in
which, by threats or promises . . • a defendant was induced. to testify
against himself." This seemed to be not far removed, if removed at all,
from the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by 'the Fifth
Amendment, although the Court had said 148 that that privilege was not
involved in these cases.
At the 1943 term, the Court, while dealing with no other rights of
the accused,1" carried further its rule respecting confessions.145 In
(at 131): " •.• it is not a matter of assumption but a certainty that the J-:ourteenth
Amendment guarantees the observance of the rule."
139
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
140
297 U.S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1936).
141
309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472 (1940).
142
314 U.S. 219'at 237, 62 S. Ct. 280 (1941).
143
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 at 285 (1936).
144
In Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944), it denied (without
prejudice) leave to file a habeas corpus petition to one who claimed that he had been
deprive~ of the effective assistance of counsel and that his conviction was based in part
on the use of evidence known by the prosecution to be perjured, the petitioner not
having exhausted his remedies in the state courts.
145 The rule as now developed had been best stated in Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547, 62 S. Ct. 1139 (1942), where the Court through Justice Byrnes, said (at 555):
"This Court has set aside convictions based upon confessions extorted from ignorant
persons who have been subjected to persistent and protracted questioning, or who have
been threatened with mob violence, or who have been unlawfully held incammunicado
without advice of friends or counsel, or who have been taken at night to lonely and
isolated places for questioning. Any one of these grounds would be sufficient cause for
reversal ••••
"The use of a confession obtained under such circumstances is a denial of due
process ..•."
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Ashcraft 'V. Tennessee 146 the Court, through Justice Black, held that
the use of a confession obtained after thirty-six,hours of continuous
questioning, in relays, was in violation of the due process clause ( even
though a jury had found that the confession was voluntary), the Court
considering that the situation was "inherently coercive." 147 A footnote
to the opinion indicates the close approach of this line of cases to the
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.148 Justice Jackson (with whom Justices Roberts and Frankfurter
joined) dissented in an opinion of great vigor. "The Constitution," he
said, "requires that a conviction rest on a fair trial," 149 from which
forced confessions are ruled out. Of course questioning for thirty-six
hours was "inherently coercive," but so was questioning for one hour, so
was arrest itself. The Court does not quite say that the Constitution
prohibits the use of all confessions made after arrest, Justice Jackson
observed, but "it is moving far and fast in that direction.mso And he
warned:
•
"The use of the due process clause to disable the States in
protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate
a use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from
social or economic experimentation. The warning words of Mr.
Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Baldwin 'V. Missouri,
... seem to us appropriate for rereading now." 151
146
322 U.S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 921 (1944). For comment, see 57 HARv. L. REv.
919 (1944). Note also the comment in United States v. Ruhl, (D.C. Wyo. 1944)
55 F. Supp. 641 at 644:
"I will say in regard to this last decision that this Court accepts it in no sense
as a matter of logic...."
147
Id., 322 U.S. at I 54.
148
A little earlier in the term Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, in
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S. Ct. 896 (1944) had contrasted the
Court's function in dealing with the admissibility of confessions in federal courts with
its review of state convictions, saying that in the latter:
"Our sole authority is to ascertain whether that which a state court permitted
violated the basic safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, in cases coming from the state courts in matters of this sort, we are concerned solely with determining whether a confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological, and not the ,
offspring of reasoned choice. How difficult and often elusive an inquiry this implies,
our decisions make manifest" (p. 68).
149
Id., 322 U.S. at 159.
150
Id., 322 U.S. at 161.
151
Id., 322 U.S. at 174. This admonition is obviously much better directed to the
subjective and elastic fair trial rule, than to protection of the specific rights of the Bill
of Rights against state invasion.
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Shortly after this, in Lyons v Oklahoma,102 the Court, through Jus:..
tice Reed, held that use of a second confession, obtained twelve hours
after the accused had made a confession admittedly involuntary, had
not deprived the accused of a fair trial, and hence did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Douglas concurred in the result; Justice Rutledge dissented without opinion; and J u~tice· Murphy ( with
whom Justice Black concurred) dissented, arguing that the confessions ·
were obtained by a single, continuing technique, tainted by coercion,
and that,
·
"The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government
from convicting a defendant on evidence that he was compelled to
give against himself.... Decisions of this Court in effect have held
that the Fourteenth Amendment makes this prohibition applicable
to the states." 138
The Court has recently been reminded of the intimate rel~tion of
the rights of the accused to the First Amendment freedoms. As Justice
Black, dissenting in Feldman v United States, observed: 1'°4
" ... The first of the ten amendments erected a Constitutional
shelter for the people's liberties of i;-eligion, speech, press, and assembly. This amendment reflects the faith that a good society is
not static but advancing, and that the fullest possible interchange
of ideas and beliefs is essential to attainment of this goal. ...
"But these men were not satisfied that the First Ame_ndment
would make this right sufficiently secure. As they well knew,
history teaches that attempted exercises of the freedoms of religion, speech, press, and assembly have been the commonest occasions for oppression and persecution. Inevitably such persecutions have involved secret arrests, unlawful detentions, forced
confessions, secret trials, and arbitrary punishments under oppressive laws. Therefore it is not surprising that the men behind the
First Am~ndment also insisted upon the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments, designed to protect all individuals against arbiti;ary
punishment by definite procedural provisions .... They sought by
these provisions to assure that no individual could be punished
except according to 'due process,' by which they certainly intended
that no person could be punished except ... after a trial conducted
in accordance with the spet:ific procedural safeguards written in the
102

(U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 1208.
Id. at 1214. Citing, in addition to the Chambers, Lisenba and Ashcraft cases,
Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629, 60 S. Ct. 612 (1940).
m (U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 1082 at 1089.
168
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Bill of Rights. If occasionally these safeguards worked to the advantage of an ordinary criminal, that was a price they were willing
to pay for the freedom they cherished."
It will be observed that the Court's efforts to crystallize its own
Bill of Rights out.of the Fair Trial Rule have not yet provided a satisfactory substitute for Madison's. They have, on the contrary, brought
the Court into more frequent conflict with state power than would have
the view wh,ich Justice Murphy suggested in the Lyons case; they have
led the Court into difficulties which are increasing; and they have
rendered the states uncertain of their powers, the person accused of
crime uncertain of his rights, because "a fair trial" is wholly subjective,·
and, as the decisions show, in no two cases means the same thing. The
Bill of Rights embodied in precise terms most of the essential requirements for a fair trial; if more are needed in a particular case, the ·Court
can add them; but it should give consideration to those already established. There is no reason why, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
standard of justice should be lower in state courts than in federal.

